Aquila European Renewables Reports 29.5% NAV Decline Amid Managed Wind-Down

The operational detail matters here. Spanish solar sites were hit by curtailment, meaning generation had to be reduced because of grid limits or negative power prices. In Finland, Olhava underperformed by 29.4%, mainly because of commercial curtailments, while technical losses stayed low and wind conditions were said to be normal.

Asset sales below NAV are the market’s real verdict

The most uncomfortable part of this update is not just the valuation drop. It is the confirmation that some assets have actually been sold below NAV, which tells investors that the published valuations were still too optimistic versus what buyers would pay.

The Portuguese hydropower asset Sagres was sold for EUR 14.7 million and matched its 31 December 2024 NAV plus interest. But the Danish wind assets and the Greek wind investment were sold at values approximately 17% below their respective NAVs as at 30 June 2025.

That is why the board is openly warning that future disposals may not be achieved at NAV. Frankly, that is the right tone. Painful, yes, but more credible than pretending the remaining book values are nailed on.

Aquila European Renewables asset sales and B share capital returns

The company is at least doing what a wind-down vehicle should do – sell assets and hand cash back. During 2025 it completed the sale of Sagres and the Danish wind assets, bringing in EUR 14.7 million and EUR 36.6 million respectively.

After the year end, on 13 March 2026, it completed the sale of its 89% interest in Desfina in Greece for cash proceeds of EUR 26.0 million. That has helped fund further capital returns.

• First capital distribution under the B share scheme – EUR 34.0 million
• Second capital distribution under the B share scheme – approximately EUR 20.4 million

A B share scheme is basically an administrative way to return capital to shareholders rather than paying a normal dividend. For investors, cash in the account is what counts, and that part is positive.

Dividend pressure, debt lock-ups and why future payouts look weaker

The dividend is going the wrong way, and that should not surprise anyone. Dividends per ordinary share for 2025 were 2.2 cents, down from 5.1 cents, while the board has already said it can no longer provide forward guidance on future dividend levels.

The reason is cash generation has become less reliable. Olhava’s lender has prohibited payments to shareholders, and the company paid an additional equity cure of EUR 508,000 in September 2025 to deal with covenant issues.

There are more complications. The Rock is trying to refinance a Green Bond maturing in September 2026, and until that is resolved the company says it is unlikely to receive cash flow from the investment.

In Spain, one solar investment breached its debt service coverage ratio, or DSCR, covenant, meaning cash movements became more restricted. In Portugal, the solar assets’ power purchase agreements expired in December 2025, leaving them more exposed to wholesale power prices that have weakened.

What the remaining portfolio looks like after the disposals

As at 31 December 2025, the portfolio was 100% operational and split 62.6% solar PV and 37.4% wind by value. Spain accounted for 45.7% of the portfolio, followed by Portugal at 17.0%, Greece at 15.3%, Norway at 13.4% and Finland at 8.7%.

That sounds diversified on paper, but the real issue is that several assets now face either revenue pressure, refinancing pressure, or both. That makes the final sale values harder to predict and helps explain why the shares trade at such a steep discount.

My view on Aquila European Renewables shares after these final results

This update is a mixed bag, but the negative side is still heavier. The good news is the board is getting on with disposals, returning capital, and being more honest about the likelihood of selling assets below NAV.

The bad news is that operational performance has been poor, power price assumptions have deteriorated, and asset sales have already exposed a gap between model values and real market prices. The fact that the secondary market has been limited, with the investment adviser being the only buyer, is another point that investors should not ignore.

The wide 35.6% discount to NAV tells you the market expects more write-downs or disappointing exit prices. I think that is a fair stance based on what is in this RNS.

For existing shareholders, this now looks like a waiting game rather than a recovery story. The prize is more cash returns over time, but the risk is that the remaining assets go for less than their 31 December 2025 carrying values, which would squeeze that prize further.

What to watch next in the Aquila European Renewables wind-down

• Sale prices achieved on the remaining wind and solar assets
• Any further write-downs to NAV
• Progress on refinancing at The Rock
• Whether Olhava can come out of lock-up and resume upstream payments
• The pace and size of further capital returns

One final point: the board now plans to stop publishing quarterly NAVs and fact sheets, moving instead to semi-annual NAV reporting. That means less frequent visibility for shareholders, at a time when visibility arguably matters more than ever.

In short, Aquila European Renewables is doing what it said it would do, but the backdrop has worsened and the value leakage is real. For investors, the key question is no longer what the portfolio should be worth. It is what buyers will actually pay.