EMV Capital has put out a better-looking set of 2025 numbers, and the broad message is pretty clear: the platform is scaling, fee income is improving, and the business is much closer to standing on its own two feet. But this is not a clean, risk-free growth story yet. The company has made progress, while still carrying the usual venture capital headaches – thin cash, valuation uncertainty and a formal going concern warning.
For retail investors, this matters because EMVC is trying to be more than a simple early-stage investor. It wants to be a venture capital platform that earns fees, manages third-party money and builds equity value across deep tech and life sciences. In tough markets, that model can be more resilient than relying purely on exits.
EMV Capital 2025 results: AUM rises to £112.5 million and losses narrow sharply
The headline number is assets under management, or AUM, which rose 14% to £112.5 million from £98.5 million. AUM is the value of assets EMVC owns directly plus assets it manages for others, so it is not the same thing as cash or net assets on the balance sheet. Still, for a venture capital platform, growing AUM is important because it can support recurring fees and future carried interest – that is EMVC’s share of investment profits above a hurdle.
Revenue also moved in the right direction. Group revenue increased 17% to £2.9 million, while EMV Capital Core revenue rose 31% to £3.2 million. That second figure is one management clearly wants investors to focus on, because it strips out the distortion caused by consolidating some portfolio companies.
| Key EMV Capital 2025 numbers | 2025 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Assets under management | £112.5 million | £98.5 million |
| Group revenue | £2.9 million | £2.5 million |
| EMVC Core revenue | £3.2 million | £2.4 million |
| Group loss for the year | £0.6 million | £3.7 million |
| Fair value of equity investments | £14.6 million | £13.4 million |
| Cash at year end | £0.5 million | £1.0 million |
| NAV per share | £0.49 | £0.52 |
| Adjusted NAV per share | £1.06 | £1.09 |
Why EMV Capital’s venture capital platform model is starting to look stronger
The best part of this update, in my view, is the quality of the revenue improvement. Corporate finance fees rose to £1.1 million from £0.7 million, fund management fees increased to £1.0 million from £0.7 million, and the Martlet Capital integration now looks like it is feeding through properly. That matters because fee income is a lot more dependable than waiting for portfolio exits.
EMVC also syndicated £12.0 million across fourteen portfolio companies, up from £10.6 million across twelve in 2024. In plain English, it is still getting deals funded in a tough market. That supports both fee income today and portfolio valuations tomorrow.
The Venture Build programme is another eye-catching part of the story. EMVC says the value of its direct stakes in the most recent Venture Build cohort has risen to £10.8 million over three years from total investment of £0.9 million in cash and in-kind support, creating c.£10.0 million of fair value and a 12.4x multiple. That is impressive on paper, though investors should remember it is fair value creation, not cash realised through exits.
EMV Capital profitability improved, but some of it is non-cash and accounting-led
The group loss narrowed 83% to £0.6 million from £3.7 million, which is a big improvement. EMV Capital Core moved to a profit of £1.5 million from a £1.5 million loss. Those are good numbers, and management deserves credit for cost control as well as revenue growth.
That said, there is an important catch. The year included £1.4 million of fair value gains, and those are non-cash. So the improvement is real, but it is not the same as saying the group suddenly started throwing off cash.
There were also some weaker valuation moves in the portfolio. PDS Biotechnology fell to £0.3 million from £1.4 million, Vortex was marked down to £3.1 million from £3.5 million, and Ventive slipped to £0.8 million from £0.9 million after 10% valuation adjustments. That is pretty normal in venture capital, but it is a reminder that portfolio values can move both ways.
EMV Capital cash position and going concern warning: the risk investors cannot ignore
This is the bit shareholders should read twice. Year-end cash was only £0.5 million, down from £1.0 million, with a further £0.3 million in readily realisable quoted securities, down from £1.4 million. Even allowing for the update that cash had improved to £1.0 million and quoted securities to £0.5 million by 15 May 2026, this is not a huge liquidity cushion.
The company also says that under conservative scenarios, up to approximately £0.9 million of additional funding may be required by June 2027 to continue as a going concern, mainly for Glycotest and ProAxsis. That is why the accounts include a material uncertainty related to going concern. In plain English, the directors believe funding can be secured, but it is not guaranteed.
There is some support here. Post-period, EMVC entered into an unsecured loan facility of £0.5 million, with the option to increase it by up to a further £0.2 million, at 11% interest and with no warrants. Helpful, yes. Cheap, no. But when cash is tight, flexibility matters more than elegance.
Deep tech portfolio highlights: Wanda, Sofant, Q-Bot, AMR Bio and Martlet Capital stand out
There is plenty going on in the portfolio, and a few names did the heavy lifting on momentum. Wanda completed a £0.86 million fundraising, secured multi-million-dollar US contracts and saw its direct fair value rise to c.£1.7 million. Deeptech Recycling completed a c.£1.22 million fundraising and now has plans around a 10,000 tonnes per annum plant in Norway backed by an indicative c.£11 million Norwegian government debt financing programme, subject to matched funding.
Sofant delivered a serious technical milestone with its Ka-band transmit array and completed a c.£6.25 million fundraising. Q-Bot looks more speculative, but also more interesting than it did a year ago after its restructuring. EMVC is cautiously optimistic there, and that feels like fair wording.
AMR Bio is the new wildcard. EMVC structured the acquisition of XF-73 assets from Destiny Pharma with only £475,000 upfront cash plus milestone-linked deferred payments. EMVC holds a 30.0% direct interest valued at c.£0.6 million, while third-party capital represents a 70.0% interest valued at c.£1.3 million. It is early, but this is exactly the kind of capital-efficient, high-upside deal the group wants to be known for.
Martlet Capital also looks like a solid strategic addition rather than a box-ticking acquisition. Integration is complete, the fund portfolio fair value grew 4.5% in 2025, and an initial secondary exit delivered approximately £0.3 million of proceeds and a 2.5x return. That is not life-changing money, but it is useful proof that the model can generate exits as well as paper gains.
What EMV Capital shareholders should watch after these 2025 annual results
- Whether fee income keeps growing and covers more of the central cost base.
- Whether the group can fund Glycotest and ProAxsis without heavily diluting shareholders.
- Whether paper valuation gains turn into real exits and cash proceeds.
- Whether AUM growth continues, especially through Martlet and the fund management side.
- Whether cash remains stable after the new loan facility.
My take on EMV Capital’s 2025 final results
I think these results are genuinely encouraging. EMVC is showing that its platform model can grow in a difficult market, and the move in Core revenue and Core profitability is probably the most important signal in the whole release. Crossing £100 million in AUM is also a meaningful credibility milestone.
But I would not ignore the balance sheet pressure. Net assets fell to £13.7 million from £14.1 million, NAV per share dipped to £0.49 from £0.52, and the going concern wording is there for a reason. So this RNS reads like a business with improving momentum, not a finished product.
For investors comfortable with early-stage venture capital risk, the story is getting more interesting. For everyone else, the cash position and funding requirement remain the main reason to stay cautious.
