Phoenix Copper's 2025 results show narrowed losses but a cash crunch and governance repair after unauthorised payments scandal. Trust and funding remain key hurdles.
This article covers information on Phoenix Copper Limited.
LON:PXCPhoenix Copper’s 2025 final results are doing two jobs at once. First, they tidy up the accounting after the unauthorised payments scandal involving the former Executive Chairman and former Chief Financial Officer. Second, they remind investors that the core business still has to solve the same old mining-company problem – turning a promising project into a funded mine.
My take is pretty simple. The Empire Mine still looks potentially valuable on paper, but the immediate investment case is no longer really about geology. It is about governance, cash, and whether Phoenix can raise fresh money before the clock runs out.
| Metric | 2025 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $nil | $nil |
| Loss for the year | $4.40 million | $7.13 million restated |
| Net assets | $38.27 million | $39.99 million restated |
| Cash and cash equivalents | $368,863 | $879,476 |
| Investment in Empire Mine | $45.32 million | $43.70 million restated |
| Short-term borrowings | $1.98 million | $1.99 million |
| 10-year Copper Bonds | $4.65 million | $4.60 million |
| Shares in issue | 261,013,300 | 197,184,092 |
The headline improvement is that losses narrowed to $4.40 million from $7.13 million. That sounds encouraging, but Phoenix is still a pre-revenue company with just $368,863 of year-end cash, so the balance sheet is tight.
The business also raised only $1.08 million from issuing shares during the year, which is not a big number when set against its development plans and debt obligations. That is why the funding section of this RNS matters so much more than the profit and loss line.
This is the part shareholders will care about most. Phoenix says unauthorised payments to Lloyd Edwards-Jones SAS totalled $1,746,145 between 2017 and 2024, with a further $21,440 paid in 2025. The older payments have been reversed through restated accounts, while the 2025 payment was written off in the year.
There is more. The investigation also uncovered another $0.64 million of unauthorised payments to other parties, including a third-party intermediary linked to potential copper bond issues, brokers and a public relations firm. These were not restated because they were already presented in the income statement and were not paid to entities where the two former directors had an interest.
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That distinction may be technically correct, but from an investor’s point of view the bigger issue is control failure. Phoenix says the weakness was that dual control of the bank mandate sat with the two individuals involved. The board has now said bank statements will be circulated to all directors monthly, alongside reconciled management reports.
That is a sensible fix, but let’s be honest – it is also basic stuff. The positive is that the board appears to have acted decisively once the issue was uncovered, including terminating both executives. The negative is obvious: trust, once lost, is expensive to rebuild.
The reason Phoenix still has a case to make is Empire. The Company says the mine’s reserves and resource potential have not been damaged by the governance scandal, and that is important. Bad management can destroy shareholder value, but it has not changed the metal in the ground.
The 2024 prefeasibility study, or PFS, used metal prices of $4.45/lb for copper, $2,325/oz for gold and $27.25/oz for silver. Phoenix says that as of June 2026, copper was $6.33, gold $4,348 and silver $68.11. If those prices held into production, the project economics would look materially better than the PFS base case.
For newer investors, NPV means net present value, essentially what the project is worth today based on future cash flows. IRR means internal rate of return, a rough measure of profitability. On those metrics, Empire looks attractive.
The reserve statement is also sizeable for a company of Phoenix’s scale. Proven and Probable reserves total 10,097,000 tonnes containing 49,677 mt of copper, 104,000 oz of gold and 4,654,400 oz of silver. That is the asset management is asking investors to keep faith in.
Here is the bit that really matters. The directors say Phoenix remains dependent on additional financing, and their own sensitivity analysis shows that, without it, a cash shortfall could arise by 30 June 2026. In plain English, that is a near-term funding risk.
The company says it is in advanced discussions with several existing and new potential investors. It expects to raise money through equity, debt and/or convertible debt, and says support from many existing shareholders remains in place. But expected is not the same as secured.
Phoenix also says it can currently meet coupon obligations due to NIU, the holder of its 10-year Copper Bonds, at the end of June 2026. After that, any delay in funding would affect its ability to meet other obligations as they fall due. That is why the auditors have flagged a material uncertainty over going concern.
This is not just boilerplate legal wording. It is the core risk in the story right now.
Phoenix repaid the Riverfort short-term loan in the year, which is one positive. But it also issued a 12-month convertible loan note to Indigo Capital LP amounting to $2.1 million, including accrued interest of $0.1 million, and that can convert into shares at a 20% discount to the prior 5-day lowest volume weighted average price.
That sort of structure can be useful when cash is tight, but it can also mean dilution for existing holders. Since the year end, Phoenix has already issued a further 26,981,814 ordinary shares at $0.0199 to settle $536,000 of loan notes. The total share count had already risen to 261,013,300 by 31 December 2025 from 197,184,092 a year earlier.
There are also 28,577,943 warrants in issue at year end. So yes, Phoenix may get funded, but shareholders should expect that funding to come with strings attached.
The Company says details of the AGM will be announced shortly, with online access available. That meeting matters because any sizeable equity raise may need shareholder approval.
Operationally, Phoenix’s plan is straightforward enough: funding, final engineering, permitting, construction, then production. The problem is that all roads still begin with funding.
This RNS is a mixed bag. The good news is that Empire still looks like a real asset with solid published economics, and stronger metal prices could make it more attractive. Losses were lower, the Riverfort loan was repaid, and the board is trying to reset governance properly.
The bad news is that Phoenix is in a fragile position right now. Cash is low, there is a stated risk of a shortfall by 30 June 2026 without new financing, and further dilution looks likely. Add in the lingering damage from the unauthorised payments scandal, and this is still a recovery story rather than a clean growth story.
If Phoenix secures funding on sensible terms, the market may start focusing on Empire again. Until then, this remains a financing and credibility test more than a mining story.
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