Prospex Energy 2025 results: strategic progress is real, but the cash and funding story still does the heavy lifting
Prospex Energy has delivered one of those small-cap oil and gas updates that looks rough at first glance, then gets more interesting once you dig in. The headline number is a bigger annual loss, but most of that came from a non-cash revaluation hit rather than an operational collapse.
My take is fairly simple. The asset base looks better than it did a year ago, especially with full ownership of El Romeral and the new Poland licences, but the company is still in that awkward phase where it has plenty of projects and not much room for error on funding.
Prospex Energy key numbers from the 2025 final results
| Metric | 2025 | 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Loss for the year | £2,795,169 | £46,759 loss |
| Unrealised revaluation movement | £2,541,311 loss | £713,583 gain |
| Net asset value | £22,939,921 | £24,590,154 |
| Total assets | £24,509,190 | £25,757,867 |
| Cash at year-end | £38,935 | £1,185,386 |
| Administrative expenses | £1,179,490 | £1,263,452 |
| Net finance income | £906,826 | £614,433 |
| Basic loss per share | (0.67)p | (0.01)p |
Why the Prospex Energy full-year loss looks worse than the underlying business
The big point retail investors need to understand is that Prospex is treated as an investment entity under IFRS. That means it does not consolidate subsidiaries in the usual way. Instead, it values those investments at fair value, and changes in that value run through the profit and loss account.
So the £2,795,169 loss is not mainly a cash burn story. The main culprit was an unrealised loss on revaluation of £2,541,311, driven primarily by reserve depletion at Selva through production and lower gas prices used in the year-end valuation.
That matters because it cuts net asset value, but it is not the same thing as cash leaving the bank. In plain English, Prospex produced gas, used up some reserves doing it, then had to mark the remaining asset value lower because year-end price assumptions were weaker.
There were a couple of genuine positives in the financials too. Administrative expenses fell by £83,962, or 6.6%, to £1,179,490, and net finance income rose to £906,826 thanks largely to interest on group loans.
Selva, El Romeral, Viura and Poland: which Prospex Energy assets matter most now?
Selva Malvezzi in Italy remains the core cash-generating asset
If you strip the story back to basics, Selva is still the foundation stone. Prospex’s attributable share of production in 2025 was 10.4 MMscm – that is million standard cubic metres of gas – and its share of gross revenue from gas sales was €4.1 million.
The field kept producing consistently from the Podere Maiar-1 well, and the operator also completed around 140 km² of 3D seismic on time and within budget. That is important because it supports the planned four-well development programme and could lift future reserves and production.
There was more encouragement after the year-end. In Q1 2026, net production to Prospex was 2.69 MMscm, sold at an average realised price of €0.43/scm, generating €1.155 million of net revenue. For me, that is the clearest proof that Selva is doing the hard work of keeping the wider portfolio moving.
El Romeral in Spain is a better asset today, but still not a smooth one
Prospex bought the remaining stake in Tarba Energía in April 2025 for €665,725, including €100,000 of deferred consideration payable on permit approvals. Full ownership of El Romeral and the suspended Tesorillo and Ruedalabola permits is strategically attractive because it gives the company full exposure to any upside.
But operations were messy. El Romeral generated 3,752 MWh of electricity in the first half, producing revenue of €365,152, then the plant went offline from 1 July 2025 due to transformer issues.
The good news is that production restarted after a replacement rental transformer was installed in February 2026. The bigger prize here is not the current power generation, which is described as intermittent and exposed to weak Spanish power prices, but the possibility of drilling five new wells and eventually connecting to the Spanish gas grid for direct gas export.
Viura has scale, but Prospex investors are still waiting for the cashflow
Viura is probably the most misunderstood part of the story. Prospex has an indirect economic interest through HEYCO Energy Iberia, and crucially it does not receive current production cashflow directly. Those funds are retained within HEI for corporate requirements and future capital expenditure.
Operationally, 2025 was frustrating. The Viura-1B well suffered a tubing leak, then testing issues, then retrieval work after equipment problems in the well. It only came back online on 17 October 2025.
Once it did restart, performance improved sharply, with average production of around 190,000 scm/d in November 2025. Q1 2026 average production was 107,800 scm/d gas and 163 scm/d water, but the company says those rates are not representative because the operator was running calibration trials for a dynamic reservoir model.
The upside case is clear enough: if Viura moves through development and into steadier production, it could become a major source of value. The catch is timing. Investors are still being asked to wait.
Poland adds fresh upside, but it is not near-term cash
The award of the San and Dunajec exploration licences in Poland gives Prospex exposure to a third European country and 100% ownership from the outset. Strategically, that is a nice addition because it offers the option to farm down later and bring in partners.
The Dunajec block also includes the Mniszów undeveloped oil discovery, which the company says has near-term commercial potential under review. Still, this is early-stage value rather than bankable production today, so I would treat Poland as upside optionality, not part of the current funding answer.
Prospex Energy funding, convertible loan notes and dilution risk
This is the section that matters most for shareholders. At 31 December 2025, Prospex had just £38,935 of cash. That is the ugliest number in the entire results statement.
To be fair, the position improved after the period end. The company said the extended convertible loan note, or CLN, fundraising reached £2 million in total, and along with higher-than-budgeted gas sales it ended Q1 2026 with an unaudited cash balance of £907,000.
That gives breathing room, but it does not make funding risk disappear. The 2025 unsecured convertible loan notes carry 12% annual interest and are convertible at 3p per share. That is expensive capital, and if converted it can dilute existing shareholders.
Prospex also raised £1.17 million before expenses in June 2025 through a placing, subscription and retail offer at 4.5p per share. The chairman openly admitted that raise was only partially successful and failed to achieve all stated objectives. I actually think that honesty is useful, because it tells you this company is still working hard to win back market confidence.
What matters next for Prospex Energy shareholders in 2026
- Stable cashflow from Selva Malvezzi
- Permit progress for five wells at El Romeral and a gas grid connection route
- Completion of seismic processing and an updated CPR at Selva
- A reserves report at Viura that could support debt funding and reduce dilution
- Early technical progress on the new Polish licences
There is also a board reset under way, with Tom Reynolds now CEO and Simon Ashby-Rudd joining as a non-executive director. That looks like a deliberate attempt to refocus on shareholder value, alternative funding and better communication.
Overall, I would call this a mixed but improving set of results. The reported loss is ugly, the year-end cash position was genuinely weak, and funding still comes with strings attached. But the underlying asset picture has improved, Selva is proving its worth, El Romeral is back online, and Poland gives the group another route to growth.
For investors, this is not yet a clean cash-compounding story. It is a small-cap energy recovery story where execution now matters more than ambition. The AGM is set for 23 June 2026 in London, and that should give shareholders a decent chance to test management on exactly how they plan to turn portfolio value into actual returns.
