Roadside Real Estate PLC Reports Transformational Interim Results with Major Acquisitions and £20.75m Fundraising

Roadside Real Estate interim results 2026: a small forecourt operator is turning into a much bigger one

Roadside Real Estate has used this half-year to do something pretty significant – it has moved from being a relatively small platform into a serious consolidator in the UK petrol filling station market. A petrol filling station, or PFS, is simply a forecourt site selling fuel, often with a convenience shop attached.

The headline numbers do not look pretty at first glance because the group posted a loss. But the bigger story here is expansion. Roadside has completed one acquisition, lined up more, raised fresh equity, unlocked cash from its Cambridge Sleep Sciences investment, and put new bank funding in place.

Key figure	28 March 2026	31 March 2025
Revenue	£3.00 million	£0.29 million
Operating profit/(loss)	(£3.96 million)	£0.91 million
Net loss from continuing operations	(£4.40 million)	(£0.60 million)
Adjusted EBITDA	(£2.40 million)	£0.91 million
Net assets	£48.90 million	£32.25 million
Cash at period end	£0.85 million	£0.31 million

One important caveat – the period is not directly comparable. Roadside changed its accounting reference date to better match the forecourt industry, and this is also the first period with a meaningful contribution from acquired forecourt assets.

Gardner Retail, DAR and Hoch acquisitions are the real driver of the Roadside story

The core investment case is now all about buying forecourts, improving operations and building enough scale to get better buying power. In plain English, the bigger Roadside gets, the stronger its hand should be when negotiating fuel supply and running costs.

The first completed deal was Gardner Retail, bought for £17.5 million net consideration and completed in February 2026. That brought in six forecourts around Cheltenham that recorded around 22 million litres of fuel sales in FY25.

Alongside that, Roadside raised around £20.75 million before expenses in February 2026. That equity raise funded the Gardner deal and added working capital, but it also diluted existing shareholders through the issue of 34,583,333 new shares at 60.0p per share.

The next step is DAR, agreed for £11.9 million net consideration and expected to complete in June 2026. DAR looks strategically important because it includes a forecourt selling four times the average volume of a typical UK forecourt, plus a bulk fuel distribution operation. Together they recorded around 98.3 million litres of fuel sales.

Then after the period end came Hoch, acquired for £28.6 million and completed on 16 June 2026. Hoch adds 12 forecourts and a standalone convenience store, with around 41.0 million litres of fuel sales in FY25.

There is also a smaller bolt-on deal for the Ross Road site in Huntley for £2.9 million, expected to complete in July 2026. That site currently handles around 4.5 million litres of fuel sales per year.

• Gardner Retail – six PFS, £17.5 million, completed
• DAR – one high-volume PFS plus bulk fuel distribution, £11.9 million, expected June 2026
• Hoch – 12 PFS plus one convenience store, £28.6 million, completed 16 June 2026
• Ross Road Huntley – one standalone PFS, £2.9 million, expected July 2026

That is a busy deal pipeline for a company of this size. It is also why management keeps calling the period transformational. Fair enough, I think.

Why the Roadside Real Estate loss looks worse than the underlying trading

Revenue rose to £3.00 million from £0.29 million, which looks explosive, but again this is not a clean year-on-year comparison. More importantly, the reported loss is heavily influenced by deal costs and non-cash valuation movements.

Roadside booked £1.37 million of exceptional costs tied to acquisitions. It also took a £1.30 million fair value loss through profit or loss. On the other side, it booked a £1.12 million gain on disposal of shares in Cambridge Sleep Sciences.

The company says net loss from continuing operations was £4.40 million, but excluding the exceptional acquisition costs this would have reduced to £2.59 million. That does not make the loss disappear, but it tells you the first half was largely about building the platform rather than harvesting profits from it.

There is one encouraging data point from Gardner. From completion on 25 February 2026 to 28 March 2026, Gardner contributed £2.995 million of revenue and £34,000 of profit. That is only a short trading window, but it does at least show the acquired business was profitable straight away.

Roadside debt, HSBC funding and CSS cash proceeds matter just as much as the acquisitions

Fast growth is great until the funding runs out. That is the part of the announcement investors should read carefully.

At 28 March 2026, Roadside had net debt of around £21 million. That included borrowings of £19.96 million, lease liabilities of £1.57 million and accrued interest of £0.32 million, less cash of just £0.85 million.

That cash balance is thin, so the post-period updates are crucial. Roadside received £14 million on 20 May 2026 from the first CSS put option tranche and another £14 million on 13 June 2026 from the second tranche. That is £28 million of cash received after the period end.

The company also secured a new £25 million HSBC debt facility, plus an uncommitted £10 million accordion. It drew £12.5 million on completion of Hoch, and expects to draw the remaining £12.5 million to complete DAR.

There is still a related-party angle worth noting. Tarncourt, a vehicle controlled by CEO Charles Dickson, had provided funding, with £6.52 million drawn at 28 March 2026 including accrued interest. That facility was repaid in full on 20 May 2026, but Roadside then drew a further £4 million from it on 16 June 2026. Related-party funding is not automatically bad, but investors should keep an eye on it.

Roadside Real Estate positives, negatives and risks for retail investors

What looks positive

• The business now has genuine scale in UK forecourts rather than just an ambition.
• Management says Gardner, DAR, Hoch and Ross Road are all expected to be immediately earnings accretive.
• DAR’s high fuel volumes could improve supplier negotiating power.
• The CSS sale structure is bringing in real cash, with a further £20 million expected in September 2027.
• Net assets increased to £48.90 million from £33.36 million at 30 September 2025.

What looks negative or risky

• Reported losses are still meaningful, with a £4.40 million net loss from continuing operations.
• Integration risk is now a big issue. Buying sites is one thing, running them efficiently is another.
• Debt has gone up and cash at the balance sheet date was modest.
• Existing shareholders were diluted by the February fundraising.
• The prior annual report included a material uncertainty related to going concern, even though the interim statement now says the directors are comfortable on that basis.

My read is that this is a classic execution story. If Roadside integrates these acquisitions properly, protects margins and uses its growing scale to improve procurement, the platform could look far more attractive in 12 to 18 months than it does on today’s profit line. If integration slips, the debt and cost base will matter a lot more.

Roadside Real Estate outlook for H2 2026: bigger, better funded, but now it has to deliver

Management says Roadside enters the second half with materially increased scale and integration progressing in line with expectations. That feels believable based on the number of deals completed or close to completion.

The market opportunity also looks sensible. The UK independent forecourt sector is fragmented, and Roadside clearly wants to be a consolidator. That strategy can work, especially when paired with convenience retail and strong locations.

For investors, this interim report matters because it marks the point where Roadside stops being a concept and starts becoming an operating forecourt group. The numbers are messy because growth by acquisition nearly always is. But the strategic direction is much clearer now, and the next set of results should give a much better test of whether this buy-and-build plan can turn scale into profits.